Section 25 of the Constitution of Australia


Section 25 of the Constitution of Australia is a provision of the Constitution of Australia headed "Provision as to races disqualified from voting’ and providing that ‘For the purposes of the last section, if by the law of any State all persons of any race are disqualified from voting at elections for the more numerous House of the Parliament of the State, then, in reckoning the number of the people of the State or of the Commonwealth, persons of that race resident in that State shall not be counted."

History

The section was proposed in the 1891 constitutional convention by Andrew Inglis Clark, the then Tasmanian Attorney-General. Clark adapted the wording from section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, which was introduced in 1868 following the US Civil War and intended to deter states from excluding certain races from voting. Unlike section 25, however, the US provision made no direct reference to race. At the time what became section 25 was introduced to the draft there was not intended to be a separate federal franchise. Rather, those permitted to vote in lower house elections at state level would form the make-up of the Commonwealth franchise. The drafters included it to ensure that a state could not on the one hand exclude people of a race from voting at the Commonwealth level while also benefiting from their inclusion in the population when determining the number of representatives that state would elect to the House of Representatives. It was argued that such a clause should be broader in order to prevent disenfranchisement such as that caused by property ownership qualifications in Western Australia, but this was never expanded on as it would have had no deterrent effect given Western Australia was to receive the minimum five representatives upon federation anyway. Later in the drafting process, section 30 was introduced, allowing the Commonwealth to legislate its own voting franchise. Section 25 was nevertheless retained, despite this somewhat diluting its purpose.
Despite the section's intention to deter disenfranchisement on the basis of race, in practice it has been of little effect. The existence of section 127 in the Constitution, which excluded Aboriginal people from being counted in population data, meant that the exclusion of Aboriginal people from state franchise had no effect on a state's population in applying section 24 to determine the make-up of the House of Representatives. Likewise, it had little effect on exclusion of other races, such as Queensland's exclusion of Aboriginal populations of other nations, as they were either insignificant in number in relation to the broader population or could be excluded by other means, such as on the basis of nationality, which would not trigger section 25. By the time section 127 was repealed, allowing the Aboriginal population to be counted in determining representation in federal parliament, all states already included Aboriginal people in their respective franchises.
There has been no direct High Court judgements relating to the application of section 25. This is largely because its existence has always been of little to no effect, and because any dispute over its application is unlikely to have been in relation to a population large enough to have any effect on the representation numbers in Parliament. It has however been referred to in numerous cases, in relation to matters such as universal franchise, voting equality, and the definition of 'people of the Commonwealth'. Justice Kirby referred to it in passing as support for the proposition that racial qualifications have been eliminated from voting.

Reform

The repeal of section 25 has been put to referendum twice. In 1967, alongside the referendum in relation to Aboriginals, it was put forward to be repealed as part of an amendment to the Constitution that would have removed the nexus between the number of representatives in the House of Representatives and the number of senators in the Senate. It failed to get a majority nationwide, receiving just 40% of the yes vote, and only passed with a majority in New South Wales. Later, in 1974, it was to be removed as part of a constitutional amendment enshrining the concept of "one vote, one value" in the Constitution by ensuring electorates at state and federal level would be based on population and not geographic size or other methods. Again, this referendum was defeated, receiving 47% of the national yes vote, and only attaining a majority in New South Wales. Both these referendums failed for reasons more complex than any controversy surrounding the removal of section 25.
The 1975 Australian Constitutional Convention referred to the section as outmoded and expended and recommended it be repealed. Likewise, the Constitutional Commission in 1988 suggested it be repealed on the basis that it was outmoded and archaic.
More recently, it has been suggested section 25 be removed on the basis that it contemplates the possibility that a state may disenfranchise a race of people. The Expert Panel on Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in the Constitution, in a report released in January 2012, among other things, recommended that section 25 be removed. As Anne Twomey points out, however, much of the criticism surrounding section 25 is misguided, with some on the panel seeming to be of the belief that section 25 allows a state to prohibit people of a race from voting. She argues that the section neither allows nor disallows such action, but merely disapproves or deters it. However, she considers removing it as part of a wider effort to remove race from the Constitution appropriate given it has no practical effect.
Others argue that the application of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 now means that a state could not prevent people of a race from being able to vote, and that due to this section 25 is spent. However, as the Racial Discrimination Act is not constitutionally enshrined, such protection is not permanently guaranteed. Regardless, the High Court may read down the Act from applying in this way so as not to allow the Commonwealth to infringe on a state's ability to legislate on its own constitutional matters as in Austin v Commonwealth.