Modal fictionalism


Modal fictionalism is a term used in philosophy, and more specifically in the metaphysics of modality, to describe the position that holds that modality can be analysed in terms of a fiction about possible worlds. The theory comes in two versions: Strong and Timid. Both positions were first exposed by Gideon Rosen starting from 1990.

Strong fictionalism about possible worlds

According to strong fictionalism about possible worlds, the following bi-conditionals are necessary and specify the truth-conditions for certain cases of modal claims:
  1. It is possible that P iff the translation of P into the language of a fiction F holds according to F.
  2. It is necessary that P iff the translation of P into the language of a fiction F always holds.
Recent supporters of this view added further specifications of these bi-conditionals to counter certain objections. In the case of claims of possibility, the revised bi-conditional is thus spelled out: it is possible that P iff At this universe, presently, the translation of P into the language of a fiction F holds according to F.

Timid fictionalism about possible worlds

According to a timid version of fictionalism about possible worlds, our possible worlds can be properly understood as involving reference to a fiction, but the aforementioned bi-conditionals should not be taken as an analysis of certain cases of modality.

Objections and criticisms

This objection can be spelled out in at least two ways: artificiality as contingency or artificiality as lack of accessibility.