Lawrence Shapiro

Background

Publications

• "Understanding the Dimensions of Realization," with Thomas Polger, The Journal of Philosophy 105: 213-222, 2008.
• “Making Sense of Mirror Neurons,” forthcoming in Synthese.
• “Lessons from Causal Exclusion,” forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• “How to Test for Multiple Realization,” forthcoming in Philosophy of Science.
• “Multiple Realizability, Seriously,” forthcoming in J. Yoo and B. McLauphlin tba.
• “Evolutionary Psychology,” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• “Functionalism and the Boundaries of the Mind,” Cognitive Systems Research 9: 5-14, 2008.
• “Symbolism, Embodied Cognition, and the Broader Debate,” in M. de Vega, A. Glenberg & A. Graesser Symbols and Embodiment: Debates on Meaning and Cognition.
• “The Embodied Research Program,” in the Philosophy Compass.
• “Epiphenomenalism – The Do's and Don'ts,” with Elliott Sober, in G. Wolters and P. Machamer, Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics.
• “Reductionism, Embodiment, and the Generality of Psychology,” in H. Looren de Jong & M. Schouten, The Matter of the Mind.
• “Can Psychology be a Unified Science?” in Philosophy of Science 72: 953-963, 2005.
• “Adapted Minds,” in J. McIntosh, Naturalism, Evolution, and Intentionality: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary vol. 27.
• “Mind the Adaptation,” in D. Walsh, Naturalism, Evolution, and Mind.
• “Multiple Realizations,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 97, no. 12, pp. 635–654, 2000.
• “Prediction and Accommodation in Evolutionary Psychology,” with Malcolm Forster, Psychological Inquiry vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 31–33, p. 2000.
• “Presence of Mind,” in V. Hardcastle, Biology Meets Psychology: Constraints, Connections, Conjectures.
• “Evolutionary Theory Meets Cognitive Psychology: A More Selective Perspective,” Mind and Language vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 171–194, 1998.
• “Do's and Don'ts for Darwinizing Psychology,” in C. Allen and D. Cummins, The Evolution of Mind.
• “The Nature of Nature: Rethinking Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality,” Philosophical Psychology, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 309–322, 1997.
• “Junk Representations,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 345–361, 1997.
• “A Clearer Vision,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 131–153, 1997.
• “Representation from Bottom and Top,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 523–542, 1996.
• “What is Psychophysics?,” in D. Hull, M. Forbes, and R. M. Burian, PSA 1994, vol. 2.
• “Behavior, ISO Functionalism, and Psychology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 191–209, 1994.
• “Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr’s Theory of Vision,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 102, no. 4, pp. 489–513, 1993.
• “Darwin and Disjunction: Foraging Theory and Univocal Assignments of Content,” in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik, PSA 1992, vol. 1.