In October 1941, after Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, which had begun on 22 June, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by and another more than already promised. The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjordur, Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic. By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; a convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores who directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaised with the escort commander.
Signals intelligence
The British Government Code and Cypher School based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Heimish. By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read LuftwaffeW/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In 1941, interception parties code-named Headaches were embarked on warships and from May 1942, computers sailed with the cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to read Luftwaffe W/T signals which could not be intercepted by land stations in Britain. The Admiralty sent details of Luftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computers. Combined with their knowledge of Luftwaffe procedures, the computers could give fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties and sometimes predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar. In February 1942, the German Beobachtungsdienst of the KriegsmarineMarinenachrichtendienst broke Naval Cypher No 3 and was able to read it until January 1943.
Prelude
Ships
This convoy consisted of 35 merchant ships: 21 American, 4 Soviet, 8 British, 1 Dutch and one of Panamanian registry. It also had one auxiliary vessel, the CAM ship. The convoy was led by Commodore N. H. Gale in Ocean Voice. The close escort was led by the destroyer and consisted of the destroyers,,, and, the anti-aircraft ship, four s, one minesweeper and four trawlers. There were two support groups; a Cruiser Cover Force led by R.Adm. HM Burrough in the cruiser, and comprising the cruisers,, and, and destroyers,, and, and a Distant Covering Force of the battleships and, the aircraft carrier, the cruisers and, and 13 destroyers.
Convoy PQ 16
PQ 16 left Hvalfjord in Iceland on 21 May under the protection of the Local Escort, meeting the Ocean Escort on 23 May. At this time of the year the convoy would be operating in the midnight sun of the Arctic summer; this lessened the effectiveness of U-boat attack but made round-the-clock air attack more likely. It also increased the chance of early detection by German reconnaissance aircraft. On 25 May, PQ 16 met its cruiser escort, but at was spotted by a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 reconnaissance aircraft, which commenced shadowing. That evening the Luftwaffe began attacks which continued for the next five days, until the convoy was in range of Soviet fighter cover. One ship was damaged and forced to return under escort; on 26 May all air attacks were repulsed but Syros, was torpedoed by. By 27 May the air attacks began to break through; three ships were sunk and another damaged around mid-day; another sunk and one damaged in mid-afternoon. That evening two more ships were sunk, and another damaged. On 28 May, the convoy was joined by the Eastern Local escort; three Soviet destroyers and four minesweepers. Their extra fire-power enabled all further air attacks to be beaten off. On 29 the convoy divided, six ships making for Archangel, while the remainder docked at Murmansk.
Aftermath
Analysis
When Convoy PQ 16 was assembled off Iceland Churchill declared it would be worthwhile if even 50 per cent got through; despite the losses the majority of the ships of Convoy PQ 16 did arrive, most ships to Murmansk and eight ships to Archangelsk. The convoy was such a success in terms the delivery of war material that the Germans made greater efforts to disrupt the following convoys. The Heavy Lift Ships from Convoy PQ 16 including stayed at Archangelsk and Molotovsk unloading ships for over 14 months. In The Year of Stalingrad the British war correspondentAlexander Werth described his participation in Convoy PQ 16 on, which was bombed but reached Murmansk under its own power.
Casualties
Eight merchant ships were sunk, six by air attack, one by U-703 and one by a mine. Two U-boats were damaged by the escorts and the Royal Navy claimed the certain destruction of a Junkers Ju 88 by the Hawker Sea Hurricane of P/O Hay from the CAM ship Empire Morn, who was killed and four more by anti-aircraft fire, with 16 aircraft claimed as probably destroyed.
Ships in the convoy
The following information is from the Arnold Hague Convoy Database.
